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ONCALE V SU1VDOWNER OFFSHORE
SERVICES INC. AND THE FUTURE OF
TITLE VII SEXUAL HARASSMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, Jody Oncale, a former employee of Sundowner Offshore
Services Inc. ("Sundowner"), filed a claim pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title WI") against the drilling company, a
male supervisor and two male co-workers, alleging hostile environment
sexual harassment.' The complaint alleged that fellow crew members
sexually harassed Oncale during three incidents in October 1991. 2 In
the first incident, co-workers Brandon Johnson and Danny Pippen
allegedly restrained Oncale while supervisor John Lyons unzipped his
pants, pulled out his penis and placed it on Oncalc's neck. 5 The next
day, Lyons allegedly forced Oncale to the ground, pulled out his penis
and put it on Oncale's arm. 4 The third incident took place in a shower
stall on Sundowner premises where Lyons allegedly threatened to rape
Oncale and forcibly pushed a bar of soap into Oncalc's anus. 5 Despite
Oncalc's complaints, supervisory personnel did nothing to stop the
harassment and Oncale quit due to fear of being raped or forced to
have sex. 6
Despite the severity of the harassment, in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc., the District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana granted defendant's motion for summary judgment holding
I See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd
and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998); Petitioner's Brief at 2, Oncale v. Sunclowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 95-568).
2 See Respondent's Brief at 1, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)
(No. 96-568).
3 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118; Catherine A. MacKinnon, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services,
Inc., 96-568, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S U. 9, 13 (1997). In
addition to the physical assault, Lyons allegedly verbally abused Oncale during this incident
stating that he was going to "fuck [Oncale]." See Respondent's Brief at 2.
4 See MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 13.
5 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118-19.
6 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998). Lyons made
repeated threats to rape Oncale including: if I don't get you now, I'll get you later. I'm going
to get you. You're going to give it to me ...." and "You told your daddy, huh? Well, it ain't going
to do you no good because I'm going to fuck you anyway." See MacKinnon, supra note 3, at 13-14.
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that Oncale failed to state a Title VII sexual harassment claim. 7 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
decision. 8 The district court dismissed Oncale's claim not because the
harassment was insufficiently severe to create a hostile work environ-
ment, but because Jody Oncale is a many Thus, in a twist of sex
discrimination irony, Oncale's claim would not have been dismissed
"but for" his gender.i°
It is not surprising that courts have struggled with this irony in
developing a body of same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence." The
judiciary has labored since the enactment of Title VII to define the
scope of the statute as it applies to gender discrimination and sexual
harassment.' 2 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimi-
nation in the conditions or terms of employment based on sex." Title
VII does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment." In fact, sexual
harassment did not exist as a legal concept when Congress enacted
Title VII." Moreover, Congress only added the language prohibiting
sex discrimination as a last-ditch effort to defeat the bill, which was
intended primarily to eliminate race discrimination in the workplace."
Congress ultimately passed Title VII without debate or discussion on
its prohibition against gender discrimination." The dearth of legisla-
tive history on sex discrimination offers little guidance to courts asked
7 See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 1995 WL 133349 *1, *2 (E.D. La. 1995),
affd, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
8
 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 121.
9 See Oncale, 1995 WI, at *2.
111 Mr. Oncale's first name is Joseph, See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 118. Ile is also referred to as Jody.
See 20/20: Man to Man (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 6, 1997).
" See infra notes 90-173 and accompanying text.
12 See generally, Melissa Manaugh Feldmeier, Filling the Gaps: A Comprehensive Review of the
Debate over Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 65 U. CIN. L. RIX. 861, 861 (1997).
"See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). The statute provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ...
Id. Because Congress intended that the term "sex" in Tide VII mean simply "man" or "woman,"
there is no need to distinguish between the terms "sex" and "gender" in Title VII cases. See
Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 749 11.1 (4th Cir. 1996). Consequently, within
this Note the terms "sex" and "gender" are used interchangeably.
' 4 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
15 See Feldmeier, supra note 12, at 861.
16 See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964); Katherine I i. Flynn, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: Sex,
Gender and the Definition of Sexual Harassment Under Tide VII, 13 GA. Si. U. L. REv. 1099, 1102
(1997).
"See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477•U.S. 57. 64 (1986); see generally Feldmeier, supra
note 12, at 862.
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to determine whether, and in what form, sexual harassment is prohib-
ited under Title VII.' 8
Although the judiciary had concluded that Title VII provides a
cause of action for employees who have been sexually harassed by
members of the opposite sex, courts disagreed regarding Title VII's
application to same-sex sexual harassment."' In its recent decision in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore SerVices Inc., the United States Supreme
Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII. 20 The Court, however, left unanswered the issue of what constitutes
discrimination "because of sex" within the same-sex paradigm." Courts
will now struggle with this issue in defining the scope of Title VII as it
applies to gender discrimination, sexual harassment and same-sex sex-
ual harassment jurisprudence. '
This Note explores the issues surrounding the debate over Title
VII's application to same-sex sexual harassment in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Oncale. 22 Part II introduces the recognized forms
of sexual harassment under Title VII and the prima facie elements of
a Title VII sexual harassment claim. 23 Part III discusses the law of
same-sex harassment prior to OnCale, focusing on the division among
the courts of appeals in determining whether same-sex harassment
occurs "because of sex" within the meaning of Title VII." Part IV
explores the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale and its resolution of
the split among the circuits. 25 Part V argues that courts should permit
only direct comparative evidence of how the harasser treats members
of both genders to support a finding that sexual harassment occurred
because of sex and that on remand, the district court should conclude
that Joseph Oncale has failed to state a Title VII sexual harassment
claim.26
15 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 ("IW1e are left with little legislative history to guide us in
interpreting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'").
12 See id. at 73 (recognizing Title VII cause of action where male supervisor sexually harassed
female employee); compare Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120 (holding that Title VII does not recognize
male-on-male claims), rev 'd and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998), with Doe v. City of Belleville,
III., 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that anyone sexually harassed may pursue Title
VII claim regardless of his or her gender or sexual orientation of harasser), and Wrightson v.
Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing Title VII cause of action for
same-sex sexual harassment by homosexual employer toward heterosexual employee).
25 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998).
21 See id. at 1002.
22 See supra notes 1-21 and accompanying text; infra notes 27-207 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 27-89 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 90-173 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 174-207 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 208115 and accompanying text.
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IL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII
Initially, the judiciary refused to interpret Title VII to prohibit
sexual harassment of either women or men in the workplace. 27 When
first asked to do so, courts balked at recognizing sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII." The early deci-
sions refusing to recognize a Title VII cause of action for sexual har-
assment cited a lack of congressional intent to regulate such behavior,
reluctance to enter the fray of interpersonal relationships and fear that
imposing liability would result in a flood of litigation. 29
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
The first cases to recognize Title VII sexual harassment claims
involved situations of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 3° Quid pro quo
harassment occurs when an employee is threatened with adverse em-
ployment action absent submission to sexual demands. 31 Courts rea-
soned that conditioning employment benefits such as hiring, promo-
tion and continuation of employment on submission to sexual de-
mands imposed a condition of employment on one gender and not
the other.52 Borrowing the "but for" test applied in other discrimina-
tion contexts, courts reasoned that, but for the employee's gender, he
or she would not have been subjected to quid pro quo sexual de-
mands." Thus, the harassment occurred because of the employee's
27 See, e.g., Tonikins v. Public Serv. Elec, & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.Nj. 1976)
[hereinafter Tomkins I] (holding that sexual harassment of female employee by male supervisor
does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller
v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (refusing to impose liability on employer
for dismissing female employee who refused sexual advances by male supervisor), rev'd on other
grounds, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Conte v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163, 165
(D. Ariz. 1975) (refusing to impose Title VII liability for male supervisor's sexual advances toward
female employee), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
28 See Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Miller, 418 F. Stipp. at 236; Comte, 390 F. Stipp. at 163,
165.
29
 See Tomkins I, 422 F. Supp. at 556-57 ("[Title VII] is not intended to provide a federal
tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack motivated by sexual desire ."); Miller, 418 F.
Supp. at 236 ("The attraction of males to fetnalei and females to males is a natural sex phenome-
non.. . . [I] t would seem wise for the Courts to refrain from delving into these matters . . .");
Flynn, supra note 16, at 1103.
See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977)
[hereinafter Tomkins II]; see generally Flynn, supra note 16, at 1106.
31 See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(a) (1),
(2) (1994).
32 See Tomkins II, 568 F.2d at 1046-47.
33 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (explaining that "but-for"
causation is appropriate standard under Title VII); City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power
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sex. 34 The "but for" test conceptually linked sexual demands to gender
discrimination and pulled quid pro quo sexual harassment within Title
VII's protection. 3'
B. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
In 1986, in its first treatment of sexual harassment, the United
States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson expanded
the scope of sexual harassment beyond quid pro quo harassment,
holding that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving
that discrimination based on sex created a hostile or abusive work
environments'' In Meritor, a female bank employee alleged that a male
vice-president subjected her to continuous sexual harassment over a
four year period."' The employee, Vinson, testified that the supervisor
repeatedly asked for sexual favors, fondled her in front of other em-
ployees, followed her into the women's restroom, exposed himself to
her and forcibly raped her on several occasions. 38 The district court
found that the supervisor had not sexually harassed Vinson because
even if there were a sexual relationship between the two, Vinson had
entered into it voluntarily and thus, it had nothing to do with Vinson's
continued employment, advancements or promo tions. 39 Because the
relationship had not adversely affected any term or condition of em-
ployment, the conduct did not implicate Title VII.4° The court of
appeals reversed, holding that unwelcome sexual advances that create
an offensive or hostile working environment violate Title VII.'"
In affirming the court of appeals' decision, the Supreme Court
explained that Title VII is not limited to economic or tangible discrimi-
nation.42 The Court acknowledged that sexual harassment which cre-
v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 710 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194,
1205 (7th Cir. 1971) (Stevens, J„ dissenting) (prima facie case of gender discrimination stated
where evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would
be different.")); Barnes v. Castle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("But for her womanhood,
... her participation in sexual activity would never have been solicited."); see also Chamberlin v.
101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990);,Jones v. Flagship Ina, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th
Cir. 1986); Stewart v. Weis Markets, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 382, 390 (M.D. Pa. 1995).
34 See Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990.
35 See id.
38 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
37 See Mentor, 177 U.S. at 60.
38 See id.
39 See id. at 61.
4 ° See id.
11 See id. at 64.
'12 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
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ales an offensive environment for members of one gender is an ar-
tificial barrier to equality in the workplace and therefore constitutes
the type of conduct Congress intended to eradicate through Title V1L 43
Thus, the Court held that Title VII prohibits unwelcome sexual ad-
vances that create an offensive or hostile work environment."
Following the Court's pronouncement in Mentor, many lower
courts struggled to identify impermissibly hostile work environments. 45
Specifically, the circuit courts split over whether an employee alleging
a hostile environment claim under Title VII must prove that the har-
assment caused injury or seriously affected psychological health."
In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its decision in Meritor and held that Title VII prohibits
harassment that creates an abusive work environment even if the com-
plained of conduct does not affect the employee's psychological health
or cause the employee to suffer injury.° In Harris, the male president
of an equipment rental company continuously subjected Harris, a
female manager, to unwanted sexual innuendoes and insults based on
her gender." Harris eventually quit as a result of the harassment." The
lower courts rejected Harris' claim, reasoning that the male supervi-
sor's comments could not seriously affect a woman's psychological
well-being and thus, did not implicate Title VI1. 50 The Supreme Court
disagreed, reasoning that such a requirement would needlessly over-
look other serious harms caused by a hostile work environment that
create barriers to equal opportunity in the workplace. 5 ' Thus, the
Court held that Title VII does not require a victim of hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment to suffer serious psychological injury in order
to stale a sexual harassment claim. 52
45
 See id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
la See id. at 66,
45 Compare Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (requiring
serious effect on psychological well-being) and Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d
1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989), with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-878 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting
requirement of serious effect on psychological well-being).
45 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993).
47 See id. at 22.
"See id. at 19. I larris' employer told her on several occasions, in the presence of other
employees, "You're a woman, what do you know?" and on one occasion called her "a dumb ass
woman." Id. The employer also suggested that he and Harris should "go to the Holiday Inn to
negotiate (Harris') raise." Id.
49 See id. at 22.
51 See id at 20.
51 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. The Court noted that a discriminatorily abusive work environ-
ment can detract from job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job or
keep employees front advancing. See id.
52
 See id.
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Through Merilor and Harris, the Supreme Court interpreted Title
VII to prohibit opposite-sex hostile environment sexual harassment,
despite the fact that the statute contains no language expressly prohib-
iting such conduct." Although expansive, the Court's interpretation of
Title VII's application to opposite-sex hostile environment sexual har-
assment is not limitless." Not all workplace harassment, even sexually
explicit harassment, implicates Title VII." The prima facie elements of
a Title VII sexual harassment claim restrict statutory protection to
unwelcome harassment that occurs because of sex and that alters the
terms or conditions of employmen
There are five required elements of a hostile environment sexual
harassment claim." First, the employee must. belong to a protected
group." Within the sex discrimination context, an employee is a mem-
ber of a protected group simply by being a man or woman, and thus,
this clement is always met."
Second, the employee must demonstrate that his or her supervisor
subjected him or her to unwelcome sexual harassment.6° Harassment
is considered unwelcome if it were "uninvited and offensive."' The
proper inquiry is whether the plaintiff indicated by his or her conduct
that the harassment was unwelcome. 62
Third, the employee must show that the harassment was based on
scx.6  In determining whether harassment occurred because of sex, the
key inquiry is whether the employer subjected members of one sex to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which he or
she did not subject members of the opposite sex." In other words,
harassment occurs because of sex if, but for the victim's sex, he or she
would not have been the object of sexual harassment."
55 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Menial; 477 U.S at 66.
54 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Merilar, 477 U.S. at 67,
55 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
56 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-68; Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir.
1996).




65 See Medlar, 477 U.S. at 68 ("The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the
alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.'"); Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377.
51 BUMS v. McGregor Elec., Indus., inc., 989 F.2d 959, 962 (8111 Cir. 1993).
1 V2 See Meriiar, 477 U.S. at 68.
63 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269).
61 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
65 See id.; Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
944	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:937
Fourth, the employee must demonstrate that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectionably hostile or
abusive work environment and to alter the terms or conditions of
employment. 66 Merely offensive conduct is insufficient to implicate
Title VII. 67
 Implicit in the fourth clement is the requirement that the
plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive such that
the terms or conditions of his or her employment were altered. 65
Finally, the employee must show that the employer knew or should
have known of the harassment and failed to take immediate and
appropriate remedial action. 69
1, "Because of Sex": The Chain of Inference Linking Opposite-Sex
Sexual Harassment to Gender Discrimination
Title VII does not expressly prohibit sexual harassment." To gar-
ner Title VII protection, sexual harassment must be linked to gender—
the harassment must occur because of sex." The causal requirement
is embodied in the third element of the sexual harassment prima facie
case.72 Within the opposite-sex paradigm, courts have had little dif-
ficulty linking quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment to sex discrimination." Particularly in the typical case in which
a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female employee, courts
presume that the proposals were made because of the victim's sex."
This occurs because of the heterosexist assumption at work within the
sexual harassment context." The heterosexist assumption operates so
that whenever a person sexually harasses a member of the opposite
sex, it is presumed to be because of sexual attraction and thus based
on gender." Further evidence that the harassment occurred because
of sex is generally not required to make out a prima facie case."
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998); Ham's, 510
U.S. at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
67 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002-03; Harris, 510 U.S, at 21; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
68 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
66 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269).
7° See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1994).
71 See Doc v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Or. 1997).
"See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Kopp, 13 F.3d at 269).
78 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
74 See Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., Co., 77 F.3d 745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996); Henson, 682
F.2d at 904.
76 See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wmng with Sexual I larasment, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691,
735-36 (1997) ("In the different-sex cases, heterosexist assumptions permit most courts to
presume that the sexual conduct between people of different sexes bespeaks sexual desire.").
76 See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752; Franke, supra note 75, at 735-36.
77 See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752.
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Within the same-sex sexual harassment paradigm, however, there
is an opposite presumption that harassment, even when sexually ex-
plicit, does not occur because of sex. 78 Consequently, courts often label
male-on-male harassment in terms that de-sexualize and dc-gender the
conduct. 79 Commentators suggest that male victims of same-sex harass-
ment labor against internalized cultural norms which presume the
unlikelihood of a sexual component to behavior among men 8°' Thus,
male victims of same-sex sexual harassment are also victimized by an
inherent disbelief that harassment between men occurs because of
sex.'' Overcoming this disbelief is the primary legal hurdle in estab-
lishing a Title VII same-sex sexual harassment claim."
2. "Because of Sex": The Analogy to lntra-Racial Discrimination
In analyzing the "because of sex" requirement of the Title VII
same-sex sexual harassment claim, courts have looked beyond sexual
harassment jurisprudence to the broader case law of race discrimina-
tion." Within the race discrimination context, courts have recognized
the possibility of infra-racial discrimination.'" Membership in a particu-
lar protected class does not preclude the possibility that an individual
will discriminate against members of that class based on their member-
ship in it. 85 The Supreme Court has similarly rejected the presumption
that an employer will not discriminate against members of his or her
own race.88
7e See id.; McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir.
1996).
79 See McWilliams, 72 F.5d at 1191 (labeling conduct "horseplay"); Johnson v. Hondo, 904 F.
Supp. 1403, 1410 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (describing harassment as a "personal grudge match"); MacK-
innon, .supra note 3, at 21.
99 See Marc S. Spindelinan and John Stoltenberg, Oncale: Exposing "Manhood," 8 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 3, 4 (1997).
81 See Spindclman and Stoltenberg, supra note 80, at 4.
82 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002; Hopkins, 77 E3d at 752-53.
"See EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995); Easton v.
Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1379 (C.D. Ca. 1995).
84 See Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dept, 802 F. Supp. 199, 206 (N.D.
Ind. 1992) (holding intra-racial discrimination, specifically, discrimination by black individual
against another black individual because of race violates Title VII); Walker v, Secretary of the
Treasury, I.R.S., 742 F. Supp. 670, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (holding light-skinned black person may
have Title VII claim against dark-skinned black person for alleged discriminatory termination of
employment).
85 See Hansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 206; Walker, 742 F. Supp. at 671.
89 See Castancda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977) ("Because of the many facets or human
motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that an employer will not discrimi-
nate against members of his own race."). The Supreme Court has also suggested that within the
gender discrimination context, a man can discriminate, because of sex, against another matt by
preferring a female employee for promotion. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County,
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Within the intra-racial discrimination context, the key inquiry
in determining whether discrimination occurred because of race is
whether the employer treated members of one race differently than
he or she treated members of other races.87 The identity of the dis-
criminator is irrelevant to the analysis. 88
 Several courts have analogized
same-sex sexual harassment to intra-racial discrimination and have
held that Title VII prohibits a person, regardless of gender, from
harassing another person based on sex. 89
III. THE LAW BEFORE ONCALE: SAME-SEX HARASSMENT AND THE
"BECAUSE OF SEX" REQUIREMENT
The elements of a Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment
claim are the same in both the opposite-sex and same-sex contexts. 9°
The third element of the prima facie case—proving that the harass-
ment occurred because of sex—is the primary legal hurdle for victims
of same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment seeking Title VII
relief. 91
 The federal courts within and among the circuits were split on
whether same-sex hostile environment sexual harassment can be
linked to gender discrimination in order to garner Title VII protection
and what proof is necessary to establish the requisite link. 92 Among the
480 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1987) (although Court rejected gender discrimination claim on other
grounds, it did not consider it significant that both supervisor and employee were men).
87 See I lansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 208 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
because plaintiff did not demonstrate that members of any other race were treated differently).
88 Seeliill v. Burrell Communications Group, 67 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (although court
found that employer had terminated employee for legitimate reason, it did not consider racial
identity of employer relevant); Feldmeicr, supra note 12, at 876-78.
89 See Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1103 (reasoning that it would be untenable to allow intra-racial
discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment cases to proceed under Title VII); Easton,
905 F. Supp. at 1379, 1380 (analogizing to reverse discrimination cases and holding that Title VII
prohibited person, regardless of gender, from harassing another person based on his or her sex).
9° See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002-03 (1998).
91 See id. at 1002. This is the key inquiry in Title VII same-sex sexual harassment because of
the disbelief held by many that social intercourse between members of the same sex does not
include a sexual component; particularly where both are heterosexual. See Spiudelman and
Stoltenberg, supra note 80, at 4.
98 See Doe v, City of Belleville, III., 119 F.3d 563, 591 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing cause of
action for same-sex sexual harassment regardless of sexual orientation of harasser); Yeary v.
Goodwill Indus: Knoxville, Inc„ 107 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 1997) (recognizing cause of action
for same-sex sexual harassment by male homosexual employer against male heterosexual em-
ployee); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996) (recognizing cause
of action for same-sex sexual harassment by homosexual employer against heterosexual em-
ployee); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir. 1996) (categorically
rejecting all claims of same-sex sexual harassment), rend and remanded, Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct 998 (1998); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors. 72
F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (refusing to recognize Title VII claim for sante-sex sexual
harassment where both alleged harassers and victim were heterosexual males).
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appellate courts that had addressed the issue, the First, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had explicitly or implicitly rec-
ognized same-sex sexual harassment as a viable Title VII claim." The
Fifth Circuit had categorically rejected all same-sex Title VII claims."
A. Fifth Circuit: Just Say No
Several courts within the Fifth Circuit had refused to recognize
same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII, reasoning that the con-
gressional intent behind Title VII supported their rejection.95 Propo-
nents of categorical rejection argued that when people of the same
gender harass one another, their conduct never constitutes discrimina-
tion based on sex as contemplated by Title VII." This conclusion was
drawn from the premise that Congress intended Title VII to prohibit
inequality only between women and men in the workplace, and not
between people of the same gender. 97 Thus, any interpretation of Title
VII that recognizes same-sex sexual harassment claims impermissibly
changes the statute's prohibition against discrimination between mem-
bers of opposite genders into a general prohibition against sexually
explicit conduct." Recognizing a Title VII cause of action against
sexually explicit conduct occurring between members of the same
gender would render the statute's causal language—because of sex—
superfluous." Sexual harassment, which is not expressly prohibited by
Title VII, would become a stand-alone cause of action.'"
In 1988, in Goluszek v. Smith, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Illinois held that harassment by male co-workers
did not create an anti-male work environment and thus was not pro-
hibited by Title The employee in Goluszek alleged that co-workers
repeatedly made comments about his supposed sexual inexperience,
showed him nude pictures of women, accused him of being gay or
bisexual and made other sex-related comtnents, 102 The court reasoned
91 See Doe, 119 F.3d at 570; Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th
Cir. 1997); Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143; Quick v. Donaldson Co., 90 F.3d
1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1996); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. I-Iosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192 (1st Cir. 1990).
94 See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120; Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 452 (5th Cir. 1994);
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
95 See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452; Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. 1456.
96 See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452; Goluszek, 697 F. Supp 1456; Respondent's Brief at 15, Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568).
97 See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
"9 See Respondent's Brief at 6-7.
99 See id. at 16.
100 See id. at 6.
191 697 F, Supp. 1452, 1456 (5th Cir. 1988).
192 See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1454.
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that in passing Title VII, Congress intended to eradicate discrimination
arising out of an imbalance of power between the sexes.'° 3 The court
reasoned implicitly that an imbalance of power between the harasser
and victim is needed in order to seek Title VII relief, and that no such
imbalance exists between members of the same sex."" Thus, the district
court held that male-on-male harassment that does not create an anti-
male environment is not prohibited by Title VII. 1D5
In 1994, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that harassment by a male supervisor against a
male employee does not violate Title VII even when the harassment
has sexual overtones.'" In Garcia, the employee alleged that his male
supervisor had grabbed his crotch and had made sexual motions from
behind him.'°7 Without explanation, the court concluded that the
actions of the supervisor could not constitute sexual harassment within
the meaning of Title VII. 1 °8 Thus, the court held that harassment by a
male supervisor against a male employee does not violate Title VII even
when the harassment has sexual overtones.'"
In its most recent pronouncement on Title VII same-sex sexual
harassment, the Fifth Circuit, in 1994, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., held that same-sex hostile environment sexual harass-
ment is not cognizable under Title VII."° As discussed above, in Oncale,
a male employee in an all-male work environment alleged that co-work-
ers had physically assaulted and threatened to rape him.'" With no
discussion of the merits of the case, the court adopted the Garcia
court's analysis of sexual harassment as binding precedent and held
that harassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does
not state a Title VII claim." 2
B. Homosexuality Requirement
For many courts, sexual orientation was material to a Title VII
claim of same-sex sexual harassment." 3 While recognizing a Title VII
103 See id, at 1456.
1 °4 See id.
165 See id.
106 28 F.3d 446,452 (5th Cir. 1994). For this holding, the court relied upon its unpublished
decision in Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. 1993). See id. at 451-52.
1 " See Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
1 °8 See id. at 452.
109 See id.
11 °83 F.3d 118,120-21 (5th Cir. 1996), reu'd and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
"I See id. at 118-19.
12 See id. at 120-21; Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
"3 See, e.g., Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1510; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195.
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cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals required proof that the harasser was homosexual in
order to demonstrate that the harassment occurred because of sex." 4
Both the Sixth Circuit. Court of Appeals and the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized a Title VII same-sex sexual harassment claim
where the harasser was homosexual, but had not decided whether
homosexuality was dispositivc to a Title VII claim. 15 For courts con-
cerned with the more attenuated link between same-sex hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment and gender discrimination, the sexual
orientation of the harasser provided a method of proving that the
harassment occurred because of sex!'" When the harasser was homo-
sexual, the courts suspected that the harasser was motivated by sexual
attraction. 117 Courts then equated the harassment of a male by a ho-
mosexual male with the harassment of a female by a heterosexual male
and concluded that the harassment occurred because of sex. " 5 Homo-
sexuality linked same-sex harassment to gender discrimination in the
same fashion that the hetcrosexist assumption connects the two within
the opposite-sex paradigm and permitted Title VII protection. " 9
I. The Fourth Circuit
In 1996, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, the
Fourth Circuit held that a claim alleging hostile environment sexual
harassment does not lie where both the alleged harassers and the
victim are heterosexuals of the same sex. 12° In McWilliams, the plaintiff
alleged that'co-workers teased him about his sexual activities, exposed
their genitalia to him, fondled him and on one occasion placed a
condom in his food. 121 In affirming the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the conduct was not
based on sex as contemplated by Title VII.' 22 Instead, the court postu-
lated that the conduct might have been because of the perpetrators'
own sexual perversion, obsession or insecurity, but not specifically
"4 See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 143 (holding that Title VII sexual harassment claim lies where
homosexual male sexually harasses heterosexual male employee); McWilliams, 72 F.Scl at 1195
(holding that Tide Vli claim does not lie where both alleged harasser and victim are heterosexual
males).
115 See Fredette, 112 F.Sd at 1510; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448.
118 See Fredette, 112 F.3d at 1505.
117 See id.; Hopkins v, Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.Sd 745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996).
" 8 See Fredette, 112 F,3d at 1505; Hopkins, 77 F.Sd at 752.
HO See Fredette, 112 F.Sd at 1505; Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752.
128 72 F.Sd 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996).
121 See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1193.
122 See id. at 1195-96.
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because of sex. 12" The court reasoned implicitly that sexual harassment
between heterosexuals of the same gender cannot be linked to gender
discrimination.'" Thus, the court held that Title VII does not recognize
a cause of action where both the alleged harassers and the victims are
heterosexuals of the same sex.'"
Later in 1996, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit revisited the issue of same-sex sexual harassment and held that
a Title VII claim for same-sex hostile environment harassment may lie
where the harasser is homosexual.'" In Wrightson, the alleged harasser,
an openly homosexual male, repeatedly made sexually explicit com-
ments to a male employee, squeezed his buttocks and pulled out his
pants in order to look down into thent. 127
 In reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
conclusion that Title VII's causal language—because of sex—fore-
closed the possibility of a same-sex hostile environment claim.' 28 The
court reasoned tacitly that the homosexuality of the harasser caused
him to harass a male employee because of the employee's gender,
thereby linking the harassment to gender discrimination. 129 With the
requisite connection between the harassment and gender discrimina-
tion provided by the homosexuality of the harasser, the court held that
a Title VII claim for same-sex harassment may lie where the harasser
is homosexual.'"
2. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
Both the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals also recognized Tide VII claims for same-sex hostile
environment sexual harassment.'"' In 1997, in Yeary v. Goodwill Indus-
tries
-Knoxville, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Title VII
claim does lie where a homosexual male supervisor sexually proposi-
dons another male because of sexual attraction.' 52 The court did not
decide whether the employee would have been able to seek Title VII
relief if his supervisor had not been homosexual.'" In Yeary, a homo-
123 See id. at 1196.
124 See id.
123 See id. at 1195.
' 26 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996).
127
 See Wrightson, 99 F,3d at 139-40.
128
 See id. at 142.
129
 See id. at 143.
130
 See id.
131 See Freddle, 112 F.3d at 1510; Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448.
132 107 F.3d at 448.
133
 See Yeary, 107 F.3d at 448.
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sexual male supervisor grabbed a male employee's arm while he was
arranging clothes and rubbed the back of his hand across the em-
ployee's chest and stomach.'" The supervisor also telephoned the'
employee and made lewd and obscene remarks.'" The court reasoned
that harassment motivated by sexual attraction occurs because of the
gender of the victim regardless of whether the harasser and victim are
of the opposite sex.'" Thus, the court held that a male employee may
seek Title VII relief where a male homosexual supervisor sexually
propositions him. 137
Similarly, in 1997, in Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title VII provides protec-
tion where a homosexual male superior solicits sexual favors from a
male subordinate. 138 In Fredette, a homosexual male maitre d' repeat-
edly propositioned a male waiter, offering employment benefits in
exchange for sexual favors. 139 The court reasoned that the inferred
motives of the homosexual harasser are identical to those of the het-
erosexual harasser since both make advances toward a victim because
they prefer the victim's gender.H" Thus, the harassment occurs because
of sex."' Without deciding whether the waiter could have sought Title
VII relief absent a showing of the maitre d's homosexuality, the court
held that when a. homosexual male supervisor solicits sexual favors
from a male subordinate, the subordinate may state a Title VII claim
for sexual harassment."2
C. Simply But For
A second approach suggested by courts to determine whether
same-sex harassment occurred because of sex was the "but-for" test.'"
Under this analysis, an employee is harassed if, but for the employee's
134 See id. at 444.
135 See id.
im See id. at 447-48.
137 See id. at 448.
138 112 F.3d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1997).
138 See Fredelie, 112 F.3d at 1504.
1411
	 id. at 1505.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 1510.
1 " See, e.g., Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 142 ("An employee is harassed ... 'because of sex' if,
'but-for' the employee's sex, he or she would not have been the victim of discrimination.");
Henson v. City of Dunde.e, 582 F.2d 897, 904. (11th Cir. 1982) (In proving a claim for [hostile
environment sexual haraisment] the plaintiff must show that but for the fact of her sex, she would
not have been the object of harassment."); Barnes v. Comic, 561 F.2d 983, 990 11.55 (D.C. Cir.
1977) ("Pin each instance the question is . . . would the complaining party have suffered the
harassment had he or she been of a different gender?").
952	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 39:937
sex, he or she would not have been the victim of harassment.'" Bor-
rowed from other discrimination contexts, the "but-for" test focused
on whether the harasser treated members of one sex differently from
members of the other sex.' 45 The proper inquiry, proponents argued,
was not whether the gender of the victim motivated the harasser, i.e.,
whether sexual attraction of a homosexual supervisor motivated him
to harass a male employee, but whether the harassment had the effect
of singling out one sex. 16 Thus, neither the sexual orientation of the
harasser nor the victim was materia1. 147 Disparate treatment of the sexes
indicated that the harassment occurred because of sex, linking the
harassment to gender discrimination and permitting Title VII protec-
tion. 148
1. The Eighth Circuit
In 1996, in Quick v. Donaldson Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the district court had erred in holding that Title VII
protects a male employee from sexual harassment by a male supervisor
only if the environment is anti-male or predominantly female.'" In
Quick, twelve male co-workers allegedly grabbed the crotch of a male
employee over one hundred times.'" Because eighty-six percent of the
work force was male, the district court held that the plaintiff had not
sustained his burden in demonstrating an anti-male or predominantly
female environment.' 51 The Eighth Circuit rejected this standard.'"
The court explained that the requisite inquiry is not whether an
anti-male or predominantly female environment existed, but whether
the harasser subjected members of one gender to disadvantageous
terms or conditions of employment to which he or she did not subject
members of the other gender.'" The court tacitly reasoned that Title
VII affords protection to those who, but for their gender, would not
144 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S 228, 242 (1989).
145 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) rile
critical inquiry, Title VIPs text indicates, is whether members of one sex arc exposed to disad-
vantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
exposed."); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
146 See Quick v. Donaldson, 90 F.3d 1372, 1378 (8th Cir. 1996); Petitioner's Brief at 28, Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568); MacKinnon, supra note
3, at 28-29.
147 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
143 See id.
149 1d.
159 See id. at 1374.
151 See id. at 1374, 1375-76.
152 See Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378.
153 See id.
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have been harassed.'" The court noted that evidence that an employer
harassed members of one sex but not the other demonstrates that the
conduct occurred because of sex.'" Thus, the court rejected the anti-
male environment requirement and held that the proper inquiry in
determining whether harassment occurred because of sex is whether
male employees were treated differently than female employees.'"
2. The Seventh Circuit's Charge and Retreat
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took the broadest view of
Title VII's prohibition against gender discrimination.' 57 The circuit's
Title VII jurisprudence recognized claims for same-sex hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment regardless of the sexual orientation of the
harasser.' 58 Moreover, at least one Seventh Circuit decision suggested
that the content of sexually explicit harassment, in and of itself, can
prove that the harassment occurred because of sex.'" Thus, in in-
stances where the content of the harassment is inseparable from the
victim's gender, for example, calling a woman a "dumb bitch," the
content is sufficient to link the sexual harassment to gender discrimi-
nation and to garner Title VII protection.'"
In 1997, in Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois, the Seventh Circuit held
that summary judgment was inappropriate where material facts per-
mitted the inference that a heterosexual male supervisor harassed
male employees because of their gender.' 6 ' In Doe, two sixteen-year-old
brothers alleged that male co-workers incessantly taunted them, calling
them "fat boy," "fag," "queer" and "bitch." 162 On repeated occasions, a
co-worker allegedly threatened to take one of the brothers out into the
woods for sexual purposes and on one occasion, grabbed his crotch to
determine if he were male or female.' 63 In reversing the district court's




157 compare Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 415 (7th Or, 1997) (holding same-sex
sexual harassment actionable regardless of the sexual orientation of the harasser), and Doe, 119
F.3d at 576 (suggesting content of sexually explicit harassment alone is sufficient to prove that
harassment occurred because of sex) with Oncale, 83 F.3d at 120 (categorically rejecting all claims
of same-sex harassment), and McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195 (holding that Title VII claim does not
lie where both alleged harassers and victim are heterosexual males).
' 5B See Johnson, 125 F.3d at 413 n.5; Doe, 119 F.3d at 591.
15''J
	 Doe, 119 F.3d at 577-78.
11-1° See id.
161 Id. at 566.
162 See id. at 566-67.
165 See id. at 567.
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sexually explicit content of the harassment spoke for itself in proving
that the harassment occurred because of sex. 161 Despite the court's
apparent approval of the presumption that all sexually explicit conduct
occurs because of sex, the majority did not rely on it as the basis for
its decision because it found additional evidence linking the harass-
ment to the victim's gender.' 65
 Still, the court implied that same-sex
harassment that is sexually explicit creates a presumption that it oc-
curred because of gender and deserves Title VII protection.' 66 Without
relying on the presumption, the court held that summary judgment
was inappropriate where material facts permitted the inference that a
heterosexual male supervisor harassed male employees because of
their gender.'"
In 1997, in Johnson v. Hondo, the Seventh Circuit retreated from its
dicta in Doe, holding that a male employee had not stated a Title VII
claim because he failed to show that sexually explicit harassment was
gender-based. 16m In Johnson, a male co-worker allegedly told Johnson
that he was "going to make him suck his dick" and made comments
about Johnson's girlfriend "having to suck his dick." 169 The co-worker
also persistently brushed up against Johnson while grabbing hirnself.m
In denying Johnson's claim, the court reasoned that besides the sexual
content of the remarks, there was no evidence to suggest that the
harassment occurred because of Johnson's gender."' The court sug-
gested that content is powerful evidence that tends to prove that the
harassment occurred because of sex, but alone it is insufficient to link
sexually explicit harassment to gender discrimination.' 72 Because the
plaintiff offered nothing more than the sexually explicit content of the
harassment to prove that it occurred because of sex, the court held
that Johnson had failed to satisfy the third prima facie clement of a
Title VII hostile environment sexual harassment claim.'"
161 See Doe, 119 F.3d at 576, 580, 596.
See id. at 580. The court relied on its finding that the plaintiffs had been harassed because
their appearance and conduct did not conform to the harassers' view of appropriate masculine
behavior to link the harassment to gender. See id.
166
 See id. at 577-78.
167 See id. at 566.
169 125 F.3d 408, 412, 413, 415 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997).
169 See Johnson, 125 F.3d at 410-11.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 412.
172 See id.
175 See id, at 412, 413.
July 19981
	
SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE	 955
IV. TILE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII
A. The Decision
In 1998, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court resolved the split among the circuits and held
that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. 174 The
plaintiff in Oncale brought a Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment claim following three incidents of harassment by male
co-workers and a male supervisor.' 75 The Court acknowledged that
Congress' primary purpose in enacting the statute was not to prohibit
male-on-male harassment in the workplace. 176 The Court explained,
however, that although Congress did not envision same-sex sexual
harassment as the "principal evil" to be eradicated, it is a "reasonably
comparable evil" covered by Title VII.'"
In reversing the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Court explained that
no justification exists in precedent or in the statutory language of Title
VII for a categorical rule against same-sex harassment claims. 178 More-
over, the Court dismissed concerns that recognizing liability for same-
sex harassment would transform Title VII into a workplace code of
civility. 179 The Court explained that careful attention to the prima facie
elements of a sexual harassment claim mitigates the risk that Title VII
will devolve into a "bad acts" statute. 18" Only workplace harassment that
constitutes discrimination because of sex is prohibited by Title VII.' 81
Furthermore, Title VII only applies to workplace harassment that is so
objectionably offensive as to alter the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.'" With these safeguards in place, the Court reasoned that sexual
harassment of any kind that satisfies the prima facie elements must. be
afforded Title VII protection.'"
In dicta, the Court also attempted to clarify what evidentiary
routes are available to establish the requisite link between sexual har-
174 118 S. Ct. 998,1003 (1998); see also supra notes 91-174 and accompanying text.
175 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.





181 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
157 See id. at 1002-03.
183 See id. at 1002.
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assment and gender discrimination.'' The Court rejected the notion
that homosexuality is the only method of proving that the harassment
occurred because of sex) The Court reasoned that the harasser need
not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex.' 56 Evidence of a general hostility toward one
gender in the workplace can also prove that same-sex harassment
occurred because of scx.' 87 The Court also endorsed the use of direct
comparative evidence regarding how the alleged harasser treated
members of both sexes to prove that harassment occurred because of
SeX. 188
In Oncale, the Court held that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII and suggested multiple evidentiary routes
to establish the required nexus between sexual harassment and gender
discrimination:89 Thus, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether
Mr. Oncale has met the prima facie elements of a Title VII sexual
harassment claim. 19 °
B. Questions Remaining After Oncalc
In its third seminal case on Title VII sexual harassment, the Su-
preme Court conclusively established that members of one gender can,
as a matter of law, sexually harass one another within the meaning of
the statute. 19 ' Left unanswered by the Court's decision is what quantum
of proof is necessary to prove that the harassment occurred because of
SeX. 192
 Although the Oncale Court discussed three evidentiary routes
that a Title VII plaintiff may use to prove that same-sex sexual harass-
ment constituted discrimination because of sex, the discussion is
184 See id.
188 See id.
186 See Oncale, 118 S. CL at 1002.
187 See id.
1511 See id.
188 See id. at 1002, 1003.
190
 See id.
' 9 ' See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
192 See id. at 1002. Although beyond the scope of this note, Oncale also leaves undefined the
parameters of acceptable behavior between members of the same sex for purposes of Title VII
liability. See id. at 1003. In applying the prima facie elements of a Title VII sexual harassment
claim to a same-sex social context, lower courts will have to flesh out what behavior creates an
abusive or hostile work environment within the same-sex social context. See id. Although within
the opposite-sex paradigm, courts have always been required to differentiate innocuous behavior
from that which a reasonable person would find severely hostile or abusive, the demarcation
between the two may not be so clear within the same-sex context. See id.
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dicta.'" Lower courts will now struggle with this issue in continuing to
develop a body of Title VII same-sex sexual harassment jurisprudence.
I. Sexual Desire
The first evidentiary route suggested in Oncale is sexual desire. 191
The Court noted that the same chain of inference linking opposite-sex
sexual harassment to discrimination would be available to a plaintiff
alleging same-sex harassment if there were credible evidence that the
harasser was homosexua1. 195 The Court reasoned implicitly that proof
that the harasser is homosexual could lead a factfinder reasonably to
assume that the harassment occurred out of sexual desire and thus
occurred because of sex.'" The Court cautioned, however, that sexual
desire need not motivate harassing conduct to support an inference of
discrimination on the basis of sex.'" In so doing, the court implied that
homosexuality need not be pled nor proven to establish that same-sex
sexual harassment occurred because of sex. 19" Because factually Oncale
involves only heterosexual males, the Court's commentary on the ho-
mosexuality requirement is only dicta. 199 Courts that currently impose
a condition of homosexuality on all same-sex Title VII claims are thus
not explicitly prohibited from doing so under Oncale, although the
spirit of the decision clearly opposes such a requirernent. 21°
2. General Hostility
The second evidentiary route suggested in Oncale is general hos-
tility. 261 The Court explained that a trier of fact might reasonably find
discrimination if a female harasses another female in such sex-specific
and derogatory terms that it is apparent that a general hostility to the
presence of women in the workplace is motivating the harasser.202
Although the Court does not elaborate, its discussion suggests that the
content of sexually explicit harassment alone may be sufficient to
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only dicta, the Court's commentary lends support to the view taken by
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. City of Belleville, Illinois,
that same-sex harassment which is sexually explicit may be presumed
to be based on sex without any further proof that the harassment
occurred because of sex. 2°4
3. Direct Comparative Evidence
The third evidentiary route suggested in Oncale is direct compara-
tive evidence regarding how the alleged harasser treated members of
both sexes in a mixed-sex workplace 445
 The key inquiry in proving that
discrimination occurred because of sex is whether the harasser treated
members of one sex differently than he or she treated members of the
other sex.206
 The Court's commentary implies that it is appropriate to
apply the "but for" test to determine whether same-sex sexual harass-
ment occurred because of sex. 2°7
V. COURTS SHOULD PERMIT ONLY DIRECT COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE
To SUPPORT A FINDING OF DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEX
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale, courts and com-
mentators opposed to imposing Title VII liability for same-sex sexual
harassment argued that such an expansion of Title VII would imper-
missibly transform the statute into a general code of workplace civil-
4.208 Enacted primarily to eradicate the discrimination inflicted on
black employees by white employers, Title VII has been transformed
over the past three decades into a much broader prohibition against
reverse racial discrimination, intra-racial discrimination, reverse gen-
der-discrimination, opposite-sex sexual harassment and now same-sex
sexual harassment. 269 These classes of prohibited conduct may seem to
2°4 See id.; Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997).
2" See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
206 See id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1992) (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring)).
207 See id.
208 See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.Sd 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996)
(to interpret Title VII to prohibit heterosexual male-on-male sexual harassment "would be to
extend this vital statute's protections beyond intentional discrimination 'because of the offended
worker's 'sex' to unmanageably broad protection of the sensibilities of workers simply 'in matters
of sex.'"); Respondent's Brief at 7, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998) (No. 96-568).
2" See Oncalc v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (holding that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment that creates hostile or abusive work environ-
ment violates Title VII); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669. 685
(1983) (holding that discrimination against men violates Title V11); TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v.
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have little to do with Congress' original intent in passing Title VII. 210
Upon close examination, however, each prohibition serves what the
Supreme Court and lower courts have declared to be the underlying
purpose of Title VII—to promote workplace equality.'"
While workplace equality is the justification for expanding Title
VII beyond race discrimination, it is also the key to reining in Title
VII."' Statutory protection should not be afforded to conduct that,
while egregious and offensive, does not implicate workplace equality."'
Such conduct, while perhaps tortious, should not constitute a Title VII
violation.'"
Within the sexual harassment context, only harassment that treats
men differently from women, or women differently from men, should
garner Title VII protection."' The judiciary has endorsed this view
repeatedly in focusing its inquiry on whether the harasser subjects
members of one sex to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employ-
ment to which he or she does not subject members of the opposite
sex." In other words, harassment occurs because of sex only if, but for
the victim's sex, he or she would not have been the object of sexual
harassment. 217 Disparate treatment of the sexes should be the touch-
stone in proving that sexual harassment occurred because of sex."' Any
other analysis would further a purpose beyond promoting workplace
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1977) ("Congress enacted Tide VII based on its determination
that racial minorities were subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in employment.");
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trial Transp, Cu., 427 U,S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title VII prohibits
discrimination against white employees); Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation
Dept, 802 F. Stipp. 199, 206 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding intra-racial discrimination violates Tide
VII); 110 Cong. Rec. 2581 (1964).
21° See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S, at 71-72; 110 Cong. Rec. 2581.
211 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (reasoning that sexual harassment
that occurs because of sex "offends Tide VII's broad rule of workplace equality"); Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) ("The goal of Tide VII is equal employment opportunity."); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (explaining that Congress intended Title VII to
eliminate "all practices in whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunities
due to discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.").
212 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; TransWarld Airlines, 432 U.S. at 71-72.
215 See Harris, 510 U:S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
214 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; Rogers v. Lowes L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 28
Empl, Prac. Dcc. (CCII) 32,553 at 24,470-73 (D.D.C. 1982) (sexual harassment may form basis
for action for common law torts of invasion of privacy, assault and battery and intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
215 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002; Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
212 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002; Harris, 510 U.S. at 25.
217 See Price Waterhouse v. llopkins, 490 U.S 228, 242 (1989); !lemon v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982).
218 See Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
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equality and transform Title VII into a general civility code for work-
place conduct. 219
A. Direct Comparative Evidence and the Heterosexist Assumption
Requiring the use of direct comparative evidence to prove that
either opposite-sex or same-sex sexual harassment occurred because
of sex would obviate the use of the heterosexist assumption which can
undermine Title VII's goal of workplace equality. 220 As discussed above,
the heterosexist assumption operates so that whenever a person sexu-
ally harasses a member of the opposite sex, it is presumed to be on
account of sexual attraction and thus, because of sex. 22 ' Within the
same-sex paradigm, however, there is an opposite presumption that
harassment does not occur out of sexual desire and thus does not occur
because of sex. 222 Although the heterosexist assumption benefits vic-
tims of opposite-sex harassment by presuming away the "because of
sex" requirement, it may often subvert Title VII's goal of promoting
workplace equality in two ways. 223
First, the presumption within the opposite-sex paradigm that har-
assment occurs because of sex can result in extending Title VII to
prohibit harassment that, while tortious and egregious, is not discrimi-
natory. 224 For example, in instances of "equal-opportunity" harassment,
where an employer harasses both a man and a woman, the harassment
suffered by the woman is not discriminatory because the harasser is
treating her similarly to members of the opposite sex rather than dif-
ferently. 225 The heterosexist assumption, however, would presume that
she was sexually harassed because of sex and would allow her to bring
a Title VII claim even though she has not been treated unequally.226
Prohibiting non-discriminatory harassment subverts Title VII's goal of
promoting workplace equality. 227
219 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196.
220
	 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
221 See Hopkins v. 13altirnore Gas & Elec., Co., 77 F.3d 745,752 (4th Cir. 1996); Franke, supra
note 75, at 735-36.
222 See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 753; McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1196; Spindelinati and Stoltenberg,
supra note 80, at 4.
22S
	 Oncale, 118 S. Ct at 1002; Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448; Henson, 682
F.2d at 904.
221 See lIenson, 682 F.2d at 904.
2" See id.
226 See Hopkins, 77 F.3d at 752; Franke, supra note 75, at 735-36.
227 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
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Second, the presumption within the same-sex paradigm that har-
assment does not occur because of sex can restrict Title VII from
prohibiting harassment that is discriminator y. 228 For example, where a
heterosexual male harasses another heterosexual male, some courts
have refused to extend Title VII protection because it was presumed
that the harassment did not occur because of sex, even though the
harasser did not treat women in a similar manner. 229 Denying statutory
protection to victims of discriminatory harassment frustrates Title VIPs
goal of promoting workplace equality." 0
A requirement of direct comparative evidence would avoid this
inequitable result and properly focus the inquiry on whether the haras-
ser treated members of one sex differently from members of the
opposite sex."' Thus, requiring use of direct comparative evidence to
prove that harassment occurred because of sex would further Title
VII's goal of workplace equality. " 2
B. Direct Comparative Evidence and the Race Analogy
Use of direct comparative evidence for sexual harassment would
also be consistent with the framework used within other intra-group
discrimination contexts. 2" Within the context of race discrimination,
the case law rejects the presumption that an employer will not discrimi-
nate against members of his or her own race."' The relevant inquiry
used within the intra-racial discrimination context to determine
whether discrimination occurred because of race is whether the em-
ployer treated members of one race differently than he or she treated
members of other races. 2" The identity of the discriminator is irrele-
vant to the analysis." Applying this framework to the sexual harass-
ment situation, the proper inquiry should focus on whether the haras-
ser treated a member of one sex differently from a member of the
other, regardless of the gender of the harasser or the victim.'"
228 See Garcia u Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3(.1 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
229 See id.
2"See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
231 See Ilarris, 510 U.S. at 25; Teal, 457 U,S. at 448.
232 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22; Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
2" See Ilansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 208.
254 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 (1977); I lansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 206;
Walker v. Secretary of the Treasury, I.R.S., 742 F. Stipp. 670, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1990).
235 See Hansborough, 802 F. Supp. at 208.
259 See Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, 67 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1995); see also
Feldmeier, supra note 12, at 876-78.
237 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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C. Application of Direct Comparative Evidence Standard to Oncale
Upon remand, the district court must determine whether Joseph
Oncale has met the prima facie elements of a Title VII sexual harass-
ment claim. 238
 Although the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale evis-
cerates the Fifth Circuit's position that same-sex sexual harassment can
never, as a matter of law, occur because of sex, the district court is free
to determine what evidentiary routes arc available to a plaintiff to
prove, as a matter of fact, that harassment occurred because of sex. 239
To ensure the promotion of Title VII's goal of workplace equality,
the district court should permit only direct comparative evidence to
support a finding of discrimination based on sex."' Thus, on the merits
of the case, the district court should conclude that Joseph Oncale has
failed to state a Title VII sexual harassment claim."' Mr. Oncale worked
in an all-male environment. 242 Thus, he cannot prove that his employer
subjected him to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which women were not exposed. 243 The harassment he suffered,
although egregious, is not inequitable. 2" Extending Title VII to protect
Mr. Oncale would transform the anti-discrimination statute into merely
a "bad acts" statute. 215
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the enactment of Title VII, the judiciary has struggled to
define its scope as it applies to sex. Although the statute does not
explicitly prohibit sexual harassment, the Supreme Court's landmark
decisions in Meritor, Harris and now Oncale have interpreted Title VII
to provide protection against any kind of sexual harassment that meets
the statutory prima facie elements.
Within the same-sex paradigm, the primary barrier to statutory
redress is proving that sexual harassment occurred because of sex. The
Supreme Court's decision in Oncale suggests three evidentiary routes
to prove that harassment occurred because of sex. To further Title VII's
goal of promoting workplace equality, the proper and only inquiry
238 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003.
239 See id. at 1001-02; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120-21 (5th
Cir. 1996).
240 See supra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
241 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001; supra notes 208-38 and accompanying text.
242 See ()male, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
243 See id.; Harris, 510 U.S, at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
244 See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
245 See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
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should be whether members of one gender were exposed to disadvan-
tageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other gender were not. The use of direct comparative evidence would
overcome inequitable results between opposite-sex and same-sex har-
assment situations. Moreover, use of direct comparative evidence in the
sexual harassment paradigm would be consistent with its use in other
discrimination contexts. To further Title VII's goal of promoting work-
place equality, courts should permit only direct comparative evidence
to support a finding that sexual harassment occurred because of sex.
Thus, upon remand, the district court should conclude that Joseph
Oncalc has failed to state a Title VII claim of sexual harassment be-
cause he has failed to prove through direct comparative evidence that
but for his gender, he would not have been the victim of sexual
harassment.
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